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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case involves the enforceability of a contractual prov1s1on entered into between 
Melaleuca and Appellants, under which Appellants are simply required to repay commissions 
improperly received from Melaleuca after the Appellants' material breach of the contract. 
Melaleuca, Inc. is an international, Idaho-based direct marketing corporation that formulates, 
manufactures, and sells nutritional, personal care, and household products such as dietary 
supplements, cleaning products, cosmetics, and shampoo in approximately fifteen countries. 
(Opinion, Decision, and Order, R. Vol. I, p. 58; Injunction Against Max, District of Idaho, R. 
Vol. II, p. 202). Appellants are former Melaleuca Marketing Executives. To put this appeal in 
its proper context, Meialeuca here provides an overview of its business model, its standard 
contractual non-solicitation provision called "Policy 20," the Foellers' uncontested breaches of 
that provision, and the proceedings below. 
11. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
A. Melaleuca's Business Model, Consumer Direct Marketing®, Relies On 
Organizations Of Marketing Executives That Are Susceptible To Raiding. 
Melaleuca owes its growth and success to the quality of its products and to the strength of 
its business model, a trademarked system called Consumer-Direct Marketing@. Unlike a multi-
level marketing company, where independent distributors purchase and resell inventory to an end 
consumer, Melaleuca's Consumer Direct Marketing® method relies on independent Marketing 
Executives who promote Melaleuca's products and refer customers to Melaleuca. (R. Vol. I., pp. 
98-99, il 13 ). Those customers purchase products directly from Melaleuca itself on a monthly 
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basis, with no intermediary, via Internet or telephone. (R. Vol. I, p. 79, ii 12, R. Vol. II, p. 202). 
Marketing Executives build a Marketing Organization with Melaleuca consisting of the 
customers enrolled by that Marketing Executive and the Marketing Executives he or she supports 
(as well as the customers and Marketing Executives enrolled and/or supported by those 
Marketing Executives, and so on). (R. Vol. II, p. 112, iJ 7). 
Marketing Executives' compensation is based on the monthly purchases made directly by 
customers from Melaleuca, and they are further compensated for training, motivating, and 
otherwise supporting other Marketing Executives. (R. Vol. I, pp. 78-79, il 9; id., p. 96, il 3). 
Specifically, compensation is based on the products purchased by customers within their 
Melaleuca organization, plus a number of factors that measure the level of leadership provided 
by the Marketing Executive, including the number of customers the Marketing Executive has 
enrolled, the Marketing Executive's status, the total volume of their Melaleuca organization, and 
the Leadership Points that the Marketing Executive generates through specified leadership 
activities. (Id., p. 78, iJ 7; id., p. 112, ~ 5). 
Melaleuca invests substantial time, energy and money into training and encouraging 
Marketing Executives to develop the skills needed to build their organizations and promote 
Melaleuca's products. (Id., pp. 96-101, ~iJ 12, 18, 20-21). Because of the leadership, training, 
and efforts provided by other Marketing Executives and Melaleuca's own investments, the 
ultimate size and scope of a Marketing Executives' organization is not a reflection of that 
Marketing Executives' individual efforts. (Id., p. 101, iJ 22) Indeed, most of the individuals in a 
Marketing Executive's organization at any given time will not have even have been personally 
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introduced to Melaleuca by the Marketing Executive, but will instead have been introduced to 
the company by someone else. (Id., p. I 12, ~' 7). 
In short, Marketing Executives and their Marketing Organizations lie at the heart of 
Consumer Direct J\1arketing@, and constitute a valuable resource for Melaleuca. Melaleuca has 
become one of the largest and most successful direct selling companies in the United States. 
Because of the knowledge, information, credibility, influence, skills, and training they receive, 
tv1elaleuca's Marketing Executives are a target for other companies, such as multi-level 
marketing companies (which employ a different business model), that rely on sales or marketing 
contractors to distribute their product. (R. Vol. I, p. 76, ii id., p. 80, il l 3). Such companies 
often resort to raiding, in which they encourage former Marketing Executives to use the special 
influence they have obtained through their association with Melaleuca to persuade or attempt to 
persuade current t\.farketing Executives to leave Melaleuca. (Id, p. 80, ~ 13; id, p. 95 ~ 4). 
When a former Marketing Executi vc raids .Melaleuca. relationships can be manipulated to 
cause the loss of a large portion of the Marketing Organization and customer base. (Id., p. 95 ii 
6). Raiding harms Melaleuca because it significantly impacts the incomes of Melaleuca's 
independent Marketing Executives, and the company loses its independent Marketing Executives 
and customers. (Id., pp. 97-98, i·~ 8, I 0). The precipitous departure of Marketing Executives 
and customers caused by a former colleague using his or her special knowledge and influence to 
raid can have a devastating effect on the ability of Marketing Executives that remain with 
Melaleuca to maintain their livelihood after investing significant time and effort to build a 
successful business. (Id., p. 97, i;~ 5-6, 8). This has a significant impact on the morale and 
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confidence of any Marketing Executives who remain with Melaleuca because they must start 
over in rebuilding what was destroyed. (Id). It also naturally affects the confidence of other 
Marketing Executives as they watch the hard work or others be destroyed and wonder if the same 
thing is going to happen to them. 
B. Policy 20, Mclaleuca's Non-Solicitation Provision, Protects Mclalcuca's 
Business And That Of Its Marketing Executives. 
To protect the investments of Melaleuca's Marketing Executives against raiding and its 
harmful results, as well as the company's investments, all Marketing Executives agree to non-
solicitation provisions in their Independent Marketing Executive Agreement ("IMEA"), 
encapsulated primarily in a provision known as Policy 20. (R. Vol. I p. 59). Non-solicitation 
clauses like those contained in Policy 20 are critical to the long-term viability of Melaleuca, and 
offer protections to the individual Marketing Executives who remain with Melaleuca despite the 
departure of another member of their Marketing Organization. (R. Vol. I, p. 84 ). 
Specifically, Policy 20 prohibits current Marketing Executives from recruiting current 
Marketing Executives or customers into another business venture, and prohibits former 
Marketing Executives from recruiting certain categories of current Marketing Executives into 
other business ventures for 12 months after termination of an IMEA. (R. Vol. III, pp. 348-49). 1 
The interests that Policy 20 serves are expressly stated in the agreement: 
1 Recruit is defined as "1) to attempt to enroll, enlist or solicit an individual or entity to join a 
business, program, or organization; or 2) to attempt to promote, influence or encourage an 
individual or entity to join a business, program, or organization; or 3) to present, or participate or 
assist in the presentation of a business, program, organization or its products. To constitute 
recruiting, such efforts or attempts may be performed either directly through personal contact or 
indirectly through a third party." (Id, p. 353). 
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Melaleuca and its Marketing Executives have made a great investment in the 
establishment of organizations consisting of Customers and Marketing 
Executives. This constitutes one of Melaleuca' s most valuable assets. . . . In 
order to protect the efforts of all Marketing Executives in building and 
maintaining their individual Marketing Organizations and Customer bases, and in 
order to protect Melaleuca's interest in the overall Customer base, Marketing 
Executives and all members of their Immediate Household are required to abide 
by the non-solicitation restrictions set out in Policy 20. 
(Id.). Thus, while Marketing Executives are free to terminate their contract with Melaleuca at 
any time, and join and be active in any other business they choose, they are contractually 
restrained from "raiding their business organizations or those of other Melaleuca Marketing 
Executives" for 12 months after their termination. (R. Vol. I, p. 7 5, i; 1 ). 
Policy 20 sets out expressly the contractual remedies available to Melaleuca upon a 
breach of the IMEA, including injunctive relief~ damages, ""''"" ' certain instances-restitution. 
Relevant here, the contract provides that a violation of any provision of Policy 20 "constitutes a 
Marketing Executive's voluntary resignation of [the IMEA,] ... and the forfeiture ... of all 
commissions or bonuses for and after the calendar month in which the violation occurred." (Id. 
p. 77, ~ 5). Policy 43 of the IMEA further provides that a Marketing Executive in violation of 
the IMEA has no right to commissions and bonuses, nor any right, title, claim, or interest to the 
Marketing Organization after the cancellation of the IMEA. (Id., p. 78, ~ 8). If Melaleuca 
mistakenly or unknowingly pays un-owed commissions or bonuses after a Marketing 
Executive's breach and termination of the IM.EA, Policy 20( c) entitles Melaleuca to restitution of 
the un-owed payments, and requires that the un-owed payments "shall be returned to 
Melaleuca." (Id.). 
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C. Appellants Breached Policy 20 By Raiding Melaleuca's Marketing 
Executives By Recruiting Them For A Competitor. 
In September 1999, Appellants Rick and Natalie Foeller entered into an IMEA with 
Melaleuca that included Policy 20. (R. Vol. I, p. 58). The Foellers continued as independent 
Marketing Executives-and were compensated as such~-until November 2008. (Id.). As of 
September 2008, Melaleuca had paid the Foellers more than $1.7 million (CDN) in commissions. 
The Foellers' Marketing Organization had 1,43 7 active customers, of whom the Foellers had 
personally enrolled only 114, or 8%. (Id, p. 79, ~] 11). Other Marketing Executives had enrolled 
the other 1,323. (Id.) 
During their time as Marketing Executives. the Foellers also became involved with 
another corporation, Max International ("Max"). (Id.). Max is "a direct sales company that 
markets its products through Independent Associates[,]" who sell products to retail customers. 
(Max Statement of Policies & Procedures, R. Vol. II, p. 213; see also id., p. 221 ). As outlined in 
the IMEA, the Foellers were free to join Max so long as they did not recruit Marketing 
Executives or customers. It is undisputed, however, that the Foellers breached Policy 20 in 
2008, and began recruiting and enrolling Melaleuca Marketing Executives and customers in Max 
while still under contract with Melaleuca. (R. Vol. I, p. 59). Over half of the Foellers· initial 
personal enrollees into Max were current or former Melaleuca Marketing Executives. (Id, p. 
85). 
Their recruitment of existing Melaleuca Marketing Executives into Max is a clear 
violation of Policy 20, which the Foellers well-knew, as evidenced by the lengths they went to in 
hiding their improper recruitment. In the end, over 500 Melaleuca Marketing Executives joined 
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Max International as a result of raiding efforts by the Foellers and others in violation of 
Policy 20. (R. Vol. L p. 74; id., pp. 85-86). Because the Foellers hid their unlawful raiding 
activities. Melaleuca did not immediately learn of their breach, and continued to pay the Foellers 
commissions under the IMEA through November 2008. During the time that the Foellers were 
raiding Melaleuca Marketing Organizations, Melaleuca paid the Foellers $23,856.41 (CON) 
under the mistaken belief that they were complying with their obligations to Melaleuca and to 
other Melaleuca Marketing Executives. 
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
On learning of the Foellers' breach, Melaleuca filed suit for breach of contract in the 
Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County on April 29, 2009. (R. Vol. I, p. 16). Melaleuca 
sought injunctive relief and claimed, as damages, "all past and future costs, damages, and losses 
incurred as a result of the improper actions of Defendants[,]" as well as attorneys' fees and court 
costs. (Id. iii! 9, 11-12; id., p. 19 (also reserving the right to seek punitive damages)). ln 
particular, Melaleuca sought a return of all commissions paid by Melaleuca but not owed to the 
Foellers since their first breach of the IMEA. (Id., p. 59). 2 
On July 9, 2010, Melaleuca moved for summary judgment in the district court. In the 
briefing on that motion, the Foellers did not deny that they violated Policy 20, nor that, as a 
2 On January 7, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, in a related 
proceeding for tortious interference against Max, granted Melaleuca's motion for temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction. (R. Vol. II, p. 208). Max was enjoined from 
recruiting any former Marketing Executives who were in the downlines (a multi-level marketing 
term Melaleuca does not use) of any current Max Associate, including the Foellers specifically, 
who had been a Melaleuca Marketing Executive within the preceding 12 months. (Id.) Max 
ultimately paid Melaleuca $1.2 million to Melaleuca for their tortious interference. (R. Vol. 1, 
p. 74). 
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result, the IMEA required them to return the un-owed commissions Melaleuca had paid them in 
the months for and after the date the violation occurred. (Id. p. 44 ). Instead, the Foellers argued 
(1) that the amount sought for the returned commissions was incorrect; (2) that Policy 20' s 
requirement that commissions paid by Melaleuca after a breach be returned was unenforceable 
because it constitutes a penalty; and (3) that the return of commissions required by Policy 20 
somehow constitutes "special damages" that must be specifically pied. (Id.). Melaleuca argued 
that Policy 20 requires the Foellers to return those payments to which they were not entitled. per 
their contractual obligations under Policies 20 and 43. (Id, p. 50). Because the IMEA expressly 
provides for the return of commissions paid, but not earned, after a Policy 20 violation has 
occurred, Melaleuca argued, damages based on the return of commissions arc not "special 
damages." (R. Vol. I, pp. 52-54). On December 1, 2010, Judge Shindurling held that the 
amount of damages sought for the wrongly paid commissions was accurate but denied summary 
judgment on the enforceability of Policy 20's requirement that post-breach commissions be 
repaid. (Id., pp. 64-65). 
After further proceedings, the Foellers moved for summary judgment on October 11, 
2011, arguing only that Melaleuca had failed to produce any non-speculative evidence of 
damages. (R. Vol. III, pp. 316, 319). On October 19, 2011, Melaleuca moved for 
reconsideration of the district court's prior ruling, arguing that Policy 20(c)'s requirement that 
post-breach commissions be repaid excuses Melaleuca from performance of the contract (i.e., the 
payment of commissions) after a material breach by a Marketing Executive. (R. Vol. I, p. 67). 
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On December 21, 2011, Judge Shindurling granted Melaleuca's motion for 
reconsideration and denied the Foellers' motion for summary judgment. (R. Vol. IV, p. 588). 
The district court adopted Melaleuca's argument and held that the Foellers· breach of Policy 20 
in July 2008 was a material breach of contract; that Policy 20( c) was not an unenforceable 
penalty clause; and that, therefore, Melaleuca was entitled to the return or post-breach 
commission payments. (Id, pp. 593-94). The district court further noted that the Foellers had 
not disputed the accuracy of the amount of commissions required to be repaid. (Id, p. 592.) The 
Foellers now appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court committed clear error in concluding that the Foellers failed to 
meet their burden of establishing that Policy 20( c )(i )' s covenant requiring repayment of 
un-owed commissions is unenforceable. 
2. Whether the district court correctly held that Melaleuca had established that there was no 
genuinely disputed issue of material fact with respect to the amount of un-owed 
commissions the Foellers must return to Melaleuca. 
3. Whether Melaleuca is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where, as here, a party asserts that a contractual remedies clause like Policy 20( c) is an 
unenforceable penalty, that party bears the burden of proving that the agreed damages are not 
reasonably related to actual damages, and are unconscionable and exorbitant. Fleming v. 
Hathaway, 686 P.2d 837, 841 (Idaho 1984). Although the Foellers erroneously equate 
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repayment of un-owed funds with a contractual "penalty," under their chosen mode of analysis, 
"it is for the trial court to determine under the facts of any particular case whether the amount 
stipulated as damages bears such reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained as to be 
enforceable .... " Nichols v. Knowles, 394 P.2d 630, 633 (Idaho 1964). "The finding of the trial 
court as to whether the forfeiture and liquidated damages constitute an unconscionable penalty 
will not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous." Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp., 706 
P.2d 34, 3 8 (Idaho 1985) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Because the district court's holding that Policy 
20( c) is not an unenforceable penalty provision was not clearly erroneous, the judgment below 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal is exceedingly straightforward. Unbeknownst to Melaleuca, the Foellers 
materially breached the non-solicitation provision of their contract with :V1clalcuca in July 2008, 
but, because the Foellers actively concealed their breach, .Mclaleuca continued to pay in error the 
Foellers' commissions, to which they were not entitled, until November of 2008. Melaleuca's 
post-breach commission payments were not owed to the Foellers and must be returned-both 
because Policy 20( c) of the contract expressly requires repayment, and because it would be 
contrary to all notions of equity and fairness to permit the Foellers to keep money they were not 
owed, and which they only obtained from Melaleuca by deception. The district court correctly 
rejected the Foellers' unfounded argument and enforced Policy 20(c), as have all other district 
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courts to consider the question. 
The Foellers' arguments on appeal do not undermine that commonsense conclusion. The 
Foellers do not dispute that they breached their contractual non-solicitation covenant by 
recruiting Marketing Executives to work for a competitor. They also concede that under the 
plain terms of the agreement, they are required to return all commissions Melaleuca paid them 
·'for and after" the calendar month in which they first violated the IMEA. Instead, the Foellers 
ask to be relieved of their obligation, principally arguing that Policy 20( c )'s restitution provision 
is an unenforceable penalty. But the Foellers utterly fail to meet their burden to prove that Policy 
20( c) is somehow unconscionable or exorbitant Moreover, Policy 20( c) cannot be considered 
"unconscionable," because even if the contract did not require return of un-o\ved commissions, 
under well-established Idaho law Melaleuca could still recover the erroneous payments in equity 
by bringing a claim for restitution. 
The Foellers' only other argument is a digression on the evidence required to establish 
expectation damages--even though Melaleuca did not seek, and the district court did not award, 
any expectation damages on summary judgment. The only relevant damages in this appeal arc 
the amount of commissions that must be repaid under Policy 20( c). iv1elalcuca proved with 
uncontroverted evidence that Melaleuca mistakenly paid the Foellers $23,855.81 CON in 
commissions in the month they materially breached the IMEA and thereafter. Accordingly, the 
district court correctly held that this exact amount must be repaid. 
See Mem. Decision and Order, Blood v. Melaleuca, No. CV-00-2479 (Idaho 7th Jud. Dist. Ct. 
Mar. 2001 ), R. Vol. II, p. 120; :\1em. Decision and Order, Jordan v. Melaleuca, No. CV-00-
2480 (Idaho 7th Jud. Dist. Ct. May 3, 200 I), R. VoL II, p. 162. 
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I. THE FOELLERS ARE CONTRACTUALLY BOUND TO REPAY POST-
BREACH COMMISSIONS. 
A. The Foellers Do Not Dispute That They Materially Breached The Contract. 
The Foellers do not dispute that they entered into an IMEA in 1999, that they had full 
knowledge of the IMEA's terms and that the terms arc unambiguous. Every Marketing 
Executive, including the Foellers, certifies that he or she "ha[s] carefully read and ... agree[s] to 
all the terms and conditions of [the IMEA] ... and the Melaleuca Statement of Policies." 
(R. Vol. III, p. 344). Provision 13 of the IMEA' s terms and conditions contains a statement by 
the Marketing Executive that he or she "ha[s] carefully reviewed the ... Statement of Policies 
and Definitions of Terms, and acknowledge[s] that they are incorporated as a part of this 
Agreement." (Id., p. 345). In short, there is no question, that the Foellers knew that the IMEA 
included the provisions on which Melaleuca here relies. 
The Foellers' breach in this action is clear. The IMEA's Statement of Policies contains, 
inter alia, Policy 20, a non-solicitation provision that expressly prohibits current Mclaleuca 
Marketing Executives from "directly, indirectly, or through a third party recruiting any 
Melaleuca customers or Marketing Executives to participate in any other business venture" and 
prohibits former Marketing Executives from doing the same with regard to certain categories of 
Melaleuca customers or Marketing Executives within twelve months of the cancellation of their 
IMEA. (Id., p. 348). Policy 20 itself contains descriptions of the importance of the non-
solicitation provision to Melaleuca's continued success and Policy 42 states that Policy 20 is a 
"material term[] to the agreement between Melaleuca and Marketing Executives." (Id., pp. 348, 
352). 
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The Foellers do not dispute that they began recruiting Melaleuca Marketing Executives to 
join Max in July 2008, while still collecting commissions from Melaleuca and certifying that 
they \'Vere in compliance with the IMEA. J\foreover, in the twelve months after the cancellation 
of their IMEA, the Foellers' violation of Policy 20 resulted in a chain reaction of over 500 
Melaleuca Marketing Executives and customers being unlawfully recruited into Max. The 
Foellers offer no legal excuse for that breach, nor do they dispute the district court's finding that 
the breach was material. 
B. Policy 20(c) Expressly Obligates The Foellers To Return Any Wrongly Paid 
Commissions. 
The Independent Marketing Executive Agreement provides that a Marketing Executive's 
violation of the IMEA or the Statement of Policies results in "forfeiture of commissions and 
bonus checks or other payments, ... cancellation of this Agreement, or other corrective action as 
specified in the Statement of Policies." (R. Vol. III, p. 345). Policy 20(c)(i) in turn provides that 
a violation of Policy 20 results in the cancellation of the IMEA "effective as of the date of the 
violation, and the forfeiture ... of all commissions or bonuses payable for and after the calendar 
month in which the violation occurred." (Id, p. 348).4 Policy 20(c)(ii) on to provide that 
the Marketing Executive is obligated to return any and all commission payments Melalcuca 
made after the cancellation of the IMEA: "If Melaleuca pays any bonuses or commissions to the 
4 Other policies incorporated into the IMEA buttress the rights and obligations set forth in Policy 
20. (See id, p. 352 (Policy 42, stating that Melaleuca may, in the event of a violation of any 
policy, cancel the IMEA; that a Marketing Executive's right to receive commissions and bonuses 
endures only "[s]o long as a Marketing Executive is complying with all policies and terms oflthe 
lMEA;]" and that the Marketing Executive has no right to the value of its Marketing 
Organization (as represented by the payment of commissions and bonuses) or any other claim to 
compensation after the cancellation of the IMEA)). 
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Marketing Executive after the date of the violation. all bonuses and commissions for and after 
the calendar month in which the violation occurred shall be refunded to Melaleuca.·· (Id 
(emphasis added)). 
Application of these straightforward prov1s10ns to this case is simple: The f oellers 
recruited Marketing Executives to Max, in violation of Policy 20. at least as early as July 2008. 
As a result, their IMEA was cancelled as of July 2008--\vhich means they lost any right they 
might have had to commission and bonus payments from that point on. Melaleuca did not learn 
of the violation until months later, and so mistakenly made several additional comm1ss10n 
payments m error to the Foellers. Under the plain terms of their contract, the Foellers are 
obligated to refund those payments to Melaleuca. See Afton Energy v. Idaho Power Co., 834 
P.2d 850, 855 (Idaho 1992) (enforcing an agreement that permitted, inter alia. the "recover[y by 
the counterclaimant ofJ the amount of its overpayment" in certain circumstances, and to 
"permanently reduce or stop future payments" in others as remedies for breach). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT POLICY 20(C) IS NOT A 
PENAL TY PROVISION. 
Unable to contest the fact of their breach or the straightforward application of Policy 
20(c) as a contractual remedy, the Foellers argue that Policy 20(c) is an unenforceable "'penalty" 
provision. That argument is meritless and was properly rejected. A remedy clause like Policy 
20( c) is presumed to be enforceable and will only be set aside "where the forfeiture or damage 
fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and 
is exorbitant and unconscionable .... " Graves v. Cupic, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Idaho 1954), 
overruled in part, on other grounds, by Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 268 P.3d 1167. 1182 (Idaho 
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2012). The Foellers fail to establish that Policy 20(c) meets any of the elements of an 
unenforceable penalty. 
A. The Foellers Fail To Bear Their Burden To Prove Policy 20(c) Is 
Unenforceable. 
The main thrust of the Foellers' argument is that the judgment below should be reversed 
because Mclaleuca arguably failed to establish that the amount of post-breach commissions that 
Pol icy 20( c) requires the Foellers to return '·bears a reasonable rel a ti on to [Melaleuca' s] alleged 
injuries." Appellant's Brief at 11. Setting aside, for the moment, that Melalcuca's injuries 
resulting from un-owed payments are by definition equivalent to the amount of the payment the 
argument still fails because the F oellers incorrectly place the burden of proof on Melaleuca. 
"The burden of proving facts to show that damages provided for by such a contract 
amount to a penalty, either because the sum to be forfeited docs not bear a reasonable relation to 
actual damages or because the agreed amount is exorbitant or unreasonable, rests upon the party 
seeking to invalidate the forfeiture provision." Fleming v. Hathaway, 686 P.2d 837. 841 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1984) (upholding judgment where party bearing burden to prove contract clause was a 
"penalty" submitted no evidence on the issue) (emphasis added); accord Woodger v. AMR Corp., 
677 P .2d 512, 514 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) ("It was not incumbent upon Woodger to show the 
reasonableness of the relationship between the stipulated damages and his actual damages. 
Rather, the burden was upon AMR to show the unreasonableness of that relationship."); M & H 
Rentals, Inc. v. Sales, 700 P.2d 970, 973 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) ("The burden of proving an 
unconscionable penalty was on [party seeking to avoid the contract]."); Magic Valley Truck 
Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 982 P.2d 945, 953 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) ("The burden of proving that 
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the damages specified in the contract bear no reasonable relation to actual damages or that the 
liquidated damages are exorbitant and unconscionable rests upon the party seeking relief from 
the liquidated damages clause."). A party's ... [b Jurden of proor encompasses both the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion." Schroeder v. Partin, 259 P.3d 617, 622 (Idaho 2011 ), 
quoting Cowan v. Bd. o(Comm'rs offl·emonf Cnty., 148 P.3d 1247, 1261(Idaho2006). Thus, 
even if the Foellers were correct (and they are not) that ··there is no evidence'' of the relation 
between Policy 20(c)'s repayment requirement and Melaleuca's damage, the Foellers ''bear the 
consequences" of the lack of evidence, not Melaleuca. Schroeder. 259 P.3d at 622. 
The Foellers submitted no evidence below to support their burden of demonstrating that 
Policy 20( c) is unconscionable, or that the amount they are required to return, $23,856.41 
(CDN), is exorbitant, arbitrary, or somehow unrelated to the damages Melaleuca suffered. The 
judgment below may therefore be affirmed on this basis alone. Fleming, 686 P.2d at 841. 
B. Policy 20(c)'s Requirement That Post-Breach Commission Payments Be 
Returned ls Not Substantively "Unconscionable." 
In any event, Policy 20( c) is in no sense "unconscionable." A contract provision is only 
"unconscionable if it is a bargain no reasonable person would make or that no fair and honest 
person would accept." Wattenharger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons. Inc, 246 P.3d 961, 974 (Idaho 
2010). "If a contract term is one-sided or oppressive, it may be substantively unconscionable." 
Id. In determining whether a term is unconscionable, a court must consider "the purpose and 
effect of the terms at issue, the needs of both parties and the commercial setting in which the 
agreement was executed, and the reasonableness of the terms at the time of contracting." Id. 
The district court correctly held that Policy 20( c) is not unconscionable because, as a 
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matter of well-established law, when one party to a contract commits a material breach, the other 
party is excused from further performance. JP Stravens Planning Assocs., Inc. v. City of 
Wallace, 928 P.2d 46, 48-49 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (holding that City was excused from 
obligation to pay fees due to planner's prior breach of the parties' agreement). The Foellers' 
breach of the non-solicitation provisions was material, both because the contract expressly so 
states, and because violating Policy 20 directly undermines many of the "fundamental 
purpose[s]" for which Marketing Executives are retained. See, e.g., Ervin Const. Co. v. Van 
Orden. 874 P.2d 506, 510 (Idaho 1993) (a material breach is one that undermines the 
"fundamental purpose of the contract"). In particular, Marketing Executives arc contracted to 
"promote the Melaleuca business opportunity, to support Melaleuca's policies, programs. and 
personnel, and to service, supervise, motivate and train the Marketing Executives in their 
Marketing Organization." (R. Vol. I, p. 101, iii! 22-24). Recruiting Melaleuca's Marketing 
Executives and customers for another business is the precise opposite of what Marketing 
Executives are paid to do. 
The district court therefore correctly held that because the Foellers materially breached 
their commitment to Melaleuca by raiding their Marketing Organization in violation of Policy 
20, Melaleuca had no obligation to continue performing, and therefore no commissions were 
"due and payable" at any point after the Foellers' breach in July 2008. If Melaleuca had known 
of the breach in July 2008, there is no question that, as in Stravens, Melaleuca would have been 
justified in ceasing all commission payments from that point forward. JP Stravens Planning 
Assocs., Inc., 928 P.2d at 48-49. It would create a perverse incentive if the Court were to reward 
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the Foellers for hiding their violations and allow them to keep unearned comm1ss1ons only 
because they were successful in their efforts to deceive. 5 
Indeed, because the Foellers deceived Melaleuca and concealed their breach of contract, 
Melaleuca paid the Foellers from July 2008 through November 2008 under the mistaken belier 
that the Foellers were honoring their contractual obligations. In endorsing each monthly 
commission check, the Foellers signed their name below the following statement: 
By endorsing, depositing or cashing this check I affirm that I am currently in 
compliance with, and reaffirm and agree to be bound by and comply with, all 
terms and conditions of my Independent Marketing Executive Agreement and 
Melaleuca's Policies, as amended from time to time. 
(R. Vol. IV, p. 549). The Foellers have never disputed that they falsely represented their 
continuing compliance with their contractual obligations. Had Melaleuca known the Foellers 
were raiding their Marketing Organizations in violation of their commitments, Melaleuca would 
not have sent the commission payments at issue. 
Policy 20( c) therefore cannot be "unconscionable, .. because it docs no more than set out 
expressly in the contract the "general rule [that] a payment made under a mistake of fact. and 
which the payor was under no legal obligation to make, may be recovered." 70 C.J.S. Payment§ 
124: Rohn v. Gilmore, 217 P. 602, 603 (Idaho 1923) ("Money paid under a mistake of fact may 
be recovered, if it was not due or payable and in good conscience ought to be returned.'"). Even 
5 The F oellers' attempt at distinguishing Stravens fails. See Appellant's Brief at 7. The 
Stravens Court held that the defendant was not obligated to pay the plaintiff anything after the 
plaintiffs material breach. 928 P.2d 46 at 49. The Court did not have an opportunity to consider 
whether the plaintiff was required to return improperly paid funds because the defendant had 
made "no payments." Id at 4 7. As relevant to this case, Stravens is clear that the material 
breach by one party excuses all performance-i. e., payment-by the other. It provides no 
support for the Foellers' position on appeal. · 
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if the contract did not expressly require the Foellers to repay the un-owed commissions. equity 
would entitle Melaleuca to restitution of the money mistakenly paid to the Foellers after they 
breached. See Milner v. I'elharn, 166 P. 574, 575 (Idaho 1917) ("Whenever one party has in his 
possession money which in equity and good conscience belongs to another, the law raises a 
promise upon his part to repay it."); see also. e.g., Seuherr E-'(cavators, Inc. v. Eu con Corp., 871 
P.2d 826, 834 (Idaho 1994) (general contractor entitled to return of money inadver1ently 
overpaid to subcontractor); Smirh v. Noble Drilling Co., 272 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. La. 1967) 
(holding "salary or commission erroneously overpaid to an employee by mistake can be 
recovered"); Century Bldg. Partnership, L.P. v. SerVaas, 697 N.E.2d 971, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998) ("Where a party pays money to another party under a mistake of fact that a contract or 
other obligation required such payment, the payor is entitled to restitution."); Rest. (First) of 
Restitution § 18 (193 7) ("A person who has entered into a contract binding upon him and has 
paid money to the other party thereto under an erroneous belief induced by a mistake or fact that 
the terms of the contract required such payment, is entitled to restitution from the other. ... "). 
Far from being "unconscionable," allowing the Foellers to keep money they are not owed 
would confer on them an impermissible windfall. The law is well-settled that in any case of 
overpayment the recipient "would be unjustly enriched by the amount of the overpayment" and 
payor "would be unjustly deprived of that amount if [it was] not permitted to recover it." Rest. 
of Restitution, § 1 comment d (1937). Accordingly, Melaleuca is entitled to restitution of the 
mistakenly paid commissions made to the Foellers after their material breach~both as a matter 
ofidaho common law and under the express terms of Policy 20( c ). 
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C. Repayment Of The Entirety Of The Un-Owed Commissions Is Not 
Arbitrary, Exorbitant Or Unrelated To Actual Damages. 
The district court correctly concluded that Melaleuca is entitled to a return of the entire 
amount of un-owed commissions that was paid in error after the Foellers breached their 
agreement with Melaleuca and resigned. This is the measure of damages required by the 
contract, and is also consistent with the relief generally available to Melaleuca under Idaho 
common law, which provides that in a case of mistaken payment, "the amount of the mistaken 
payment establishes the pecuniary benefit to the defondant" and is the only proper measure of 
damages. Jones v. Whiteley. 736 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987): Rest. (First) 
Restitution § 150 ( 1937) ("In an action of restitution in which the benefit received was money, 
the measure of recovery for this benefit is the amount of money received."). 
The Foellers do not expressly argue that the amount of the commissions they must repay 
is arbitrary or exorbitant, although they appear to nod in that direction by including a perfunctory 
statement that Melaleuca received some •·benefit" from the Foellers' work as Marketing 
Executives notwithstanding their breach of the non-solicitation requirements. Appellants' Brief 
at 11 l However, under the plain terms of Policy 20( c ), Melaleuca is not required to prove that 
it suffered damages other than the payment of un-owed commissions to be entitled to recovery of 
those payments. Nor is Melaleuca required to off-set the amount of an un-owed payment 
any purported "value" Melaleuca might have received from the Foellers' pre-breach activities. 
See, e.g., Schroeder v. Rose, 701 P.2d 327, 330 (Idaho Ct App. 1985) ("the seller need not prove 
actual injury" to be excused from paying broker's commission, and "need only show that the 
realtor's breach of fiduciary duty, if it occurred, was substantial and represents the failure of a 
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condition precedent to collecting a commission"); Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Jdoho, 732 P.2d 699, 709 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (upholding forfeiture clause where "by engaging 
in competitive activity shortly after his contract was terminated'' insurance agent ·'contractually 
forfeited his right to these commissions" and "has no separate claim for the ·value' of his 
business."), abrogated on other grounds by A1etcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co .. 778 P.2d 744 
(Idaho 1989); accord Sozahern Fann Bureau Ins. Co. v. A1itchell, 435 So. 2d 745, 748-9 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (insurance agent "has no grounds to argue that Southern Farm Bureau 
owes him money on a contract he has breached'' by violating non-compete clause). The Foellers 
were not owed any of the commissions they received after their material breach, and all of the 
money they received must be returned. 
III. THE AMOUNT OF POST-BREACH COMMISSIONS \VAS PROVEN WITH 
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE. 
The record demonstrates, and the district court agreed, that Melaleuca is contractually 
entitled to recover precisely $23,856.41 (CDN) in repayment of commissions paid for the 
months of and after the Foellers' breach. (R. Vol. IV, p. 592: R. Vol. I, pp. 61-62 (12/1/10 
decision describing evidence presented on first summary judgment briefing and ruling that 
,856.41 (CDN) is the appropriate award for commissions wrongly paid)). 
Nevertheless, the Foellcrs confusingly argue that Melaleuea failed to prove its 
expectation damages with "reasonable certainty" and failed to prove "intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage." Appellants' Brief at 8-9; 11-12. This is all totally 
irrelevant. Melaleuca moved for summary judgment only on the issue of Melaleuca's 
contractual entitlement to a return of un-owed commissions under Policy 20( c) as a result of the 
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Foellers' breach. Melaleuca did not seek summary judgment with respect to any other kind of 
damages, and did not pursue any claim other than its claim for breach of contract. (R. Vol. l, p. 
48, p. 90). While Policy 20 expressly entitles Melalcuca to seek other damages resulting from 
the Foellers' raiding in the form of lost profits or consequential damages-an amount far in 
excess of post-breach commissions-those damages are not relevant here. See Afton Energy, 
834 P .2d at 856 ("[N]o question of construction arises where a contract, by its terms. provides 
that the contractual remedy shall, or shall not be exclusive other remedies.") (citation 
omitted). Policy 20 obligates the Foellers to refund wrongfully paid commissions, and the 
amount thereof has been proven with uncontroverted evidence. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
This matter arises out of a commercial contract. As such, should Melaleuca prevail on 
appeal, it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 1 120. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
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